

Policy Document

Human Security Collective

A new Foundation that protects and expands political space of civil society and puts human security into practice

1 Introduction

Major transitions

We are living in a world of major transitions. Emerging powers from the East and the South are gaining influence and push back the established post-colonial power of Europe and the 20th century imperialistic military position of the USA. There is an increasing pressure on natural resources, a rapid economic growth of developing countries which are trading off their extractives and land, upcoming middle classes in formerly poor regions, with citizens raising their voices, claiming their rights and holding their governments to account. The demographic map of the world shows the ageing of population in the West-Europe offering political momentum to conservatism and consolidation while the Arab region, sub Sahel Africa, South East Asia with around 70% of the population below the age of 30, shows the dynamic of young people that are looking for jobs and other opportunities across borders. People easily connect to each other by using mobile phone, the internet and social networks, pulling down the traditional barriers that impeded them to move and mobilize. The flipside is the use by governments of the same technologies for data surveillance, intelligence and policing.

These transitions influence international development. The post colonial development notions and corresponding architecture are becoming outdated. Development aid has become one of the instruments for social change and poverty alleviation and ceased to be the most prominent one. The fundamentals of the architecture through which Nordic traditional donors transferred money, determined national fiscal and political regimes, secured their own geopolitical interests and pushed for democratization and human rights, are weakened.

Who is calling the shots?

Erstwhile developing countries have become powerful and now determine the conditions for development. Western and Nordic donors are seeking appropriate responses to these changes. For decades they were in control – not any longer. The very notion of development as a bottom-up process which should be guided by democratic changes and empowerment of people and communities is being contested by emerging powers and by forces that oppose the dominance of the Western world and its values.

Yet, in many economically upcoming countries development is taking place within an ineffective and unaccountable political and governance system - in a democratic, justice and empowerment void. In so called fragile states we see growing insecurity of vulnerable populations due to the governance, justice and empowerment gap. In resource rich countries or those which basically lack any formal governance, the opportunities for armed, criminal and violent groups to recruit young people are strong. There is a withdrawal of private investors from areas which are not secure or an increase of private security companies and paramilitary to protect investment interests. The daily security of communities and families is at stake.

In authoritarian states we witness uprisings which lead to situations of great uncertainty and insecurity for people as transitions are violent. In others the frustration about lack of civil and political rights among upcoming professional middle classes and organized protests of communities against corrupted local authorities and companies challenge the government. In maturing democracies the gap between ultra-rich and ultra-poor is growing as is the frustration of middle classes about the inadequacies and corruption of the governance model.

Governments and state authorities are faced with growing unrest and insecurity and primarily respond with counter violence or repression. In a number of countries governments are not capable to act when their populations are violated and the international community lacks the mandate and capabilities to intervene timely.

Security has become a major issue for governments and for the international community. It has become a topical subject which development actors and social change agents cannot ignore. Yet the involvement of development actors in security practice has been limited to relatively few initiatives in conflict areas and has not yet evolved into a consistent body of knowledge based on lived realities. The need for this body of knowledge and organized mechanisms to engage with "the security world " becomes urgent as security actors have the power, means and capacities to determine development processes.

The paradox

There is a growing recognition as evidenced in the e.g. The World Development Report of civil society's vital role in furthering development and social justice in in fragile contexts. Donors equally have come to realize that state repression and terror are not sustainable if people want more civil liberties. The Arab uprisings also show that decades of oppression prevented the development of civil society and created a void in organized citizen's action which is vital to build democracies.

Here is the paradox. While there is growing recognition that civil society's operational and political space is paramount for development and social justice transformations, there is a worldwide push back of civil society. The war on terror and subsequent counter terrorism measures have worsened this pushback.

This shrinking operational and political space of civil society has concerned development donors. Their concern is primarily informed by notions of an enabling environment for civil society to contribute to development (MDG and post MDG) objectives. The security policy shapers hardly appreciate this, primarily because they have little understanding of civil society. Civil society actors that live and work in violent circumstances are often literally squeezed between the violence from armed and terrorist groups and the counter violence from state actors. Civil society that supports the rights of disenfranchised groups and aim for their inclusion in society face violent push back from extremist groups and governments alike. Peace builders have become labeled as terrorist themselves because they engage with groups that are listed and work closely with communities that are in the frontline of violent extremism. In humanitarian crises, humanitarian space has been reduced due to counter terrorism measures that inhibit access to proscribed groups and to communities that are controlled by terrorist groups. In line with growing resentment against western actors, humanitarian workers are assaulted by violent extremists.

Counter terrorism revisited

The post 9/11 world with its counter terrorism rhetoric has given international legitimization and support to repressive governments. It gave way to a world-wide momentum for security-led development. While the CTM rhetoric undeniably lost its influence in the past years, a number of countering terrorism measures has become institutionalized nationally and internationally. Countering terrorism has become a matter not so much of the use of military or hard power but of a systemic approach that aims among others to end financial flows to terrorists and the appeal to terrorism. State and multilateral bureaucracies and a significant number of national governments have embraced counter terrorism measures and regulations as a pretext to reduce the political space for critical citizens' voices.

Civil society engagement with security and counter terrorism actors and their agenda's is still too limited. Civil society that does engage institutionally consists of think tanks and research institutes, not the ones that are active in local contexts. Peace builders, human rights defenders, humanitarian and development works all are dealing with security issues. They do not label their work as security or countering terrorism, unless it is framed as Human Security, Citizens' Security, Community Security or Inclusive Security or Humanitarian Space. The gap between the security sector and civil society is still significant and is caused by lack of knowledge and trust but also by the absence of known good practices on effective cooperation.

It is timely that civil society collectively disseminates alternative approaches to countering violence extremism and put human security high on the agenda of security and development actors. It is timely that a strong and critical engagement with the security and counter terrorism worlds gets more followers from civil society.

2 The challenge

Over the past 10 years we have seen an increasing number of states, both democratic and authoritarian, that use the fear of terrorists among the general population as a pretext to clamp down on civil society's operational and political space. Apart from states like Russia and China, many others have become increasingly restrictive towards civil society. Among these are India, Uganda, Ethiopia, Israel, North Sudan, Egypt, Turkey, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, Nicaragua and countries in Central Asia. But also in our own Western society we experience an increasing restrictive climate towards activism and what is generally understood by the "public interest".

Governments can restrict civil society in roughly three ways: The first is by changing the constitution through the restriction of fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech and association. The second is by changing NGO law such as restricting funding channels or prohibiting foreign funding and freezing assets. The third is by imposing counterterrorism and security measures such as "blacklisting of violent extremists".

These restrictions are often accompanied by a culture of fear ("those that are not with us are against us") that becomes embedded in the society's social fabric and is abused politically by those in powerful positions. Persons and civil society organizations in mentioned countries are easily criminalized or delegitimized by their governments. Particularly human rights defenders, local peace builders and social activists that pressure authorities to account for their political and policy decisions concerning security, economic investments and financial spending are suspect and imprisoned, tortured or worse killed. Broad brush international counter terrorism measures legitimize national restrictive measures and destructive actions. The effect is counter-productive. Violent extremists benefit from the empowerment, justice and democracy void created by bad and inadequate governance.

The counter terrorism language may have been changed but the measures are firmly in place and incorporated in standards and regulations that are enforced through global regimes like the partner vetting system of USAID, the material support act of the US government, UN sanctions regimes, international Anti Money Laundering and Countering Finance of Terrorism standards of the Financial Action Task Force, the World Bank and IMF and the attempts of the European Union to develop a code of conduct for all European Not for Profit organizations.

The failures of humanitarian interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab uprisings and the crises in Mali and other parts of the Sahel create at the same time a window of

opportunity to work on alternative strategies to further development and security for communities.

3 Vision and Mission

Vision

Political space for civil society is promoted and safeguarded by the international community through principles that are based on universal human rights conventions and declarations. This space is delegitimized by governments and international enforcement regimes through restrictive counter terrorism and security measures. The foundation challenges the delegitimization of civil society. The foundation's ambition is to change the current counter terrorism and hard security strategies into human security strategies.

Mission statement

The Human Security Collective protects and expands the operational and political space of civil society and puts human security into practice:

- We convene, coordinate and facilitate dialogue between civil society, policy shapers and other actors to enhance alternative approaches to current security and counter terrorism practice.*
- We encourage and support activists and practitioners to document, analyze and disseminate their security alternatives among civil society and security and development actors*
- We provide a secure platform for human security interaction*

4 Objectives and core business

Objectives of the foundation


The foundation's objectives are in line with its vision and its mission. The overall objective is to change the current counter terrorism and hard security strategies into human security strategies. Therefore a more inclusive and effective approach to security

should be realized and political space for civil society should be promoted and safeguarded by the international community.

The foundation will reach its objectives by the following strategies:

1. Operating as a hub to facilitate the development of the Civil Society Network for Human Security¹ (CSNHS) and strengthening capacities to counter violent extremism at grass root level
2. Generating and connecting knowledge, expertise and practices from local contexts and communities to policy makers and interested groups in society through research and advocacy
3. Providing a platform to link local community representatives with policymakers to validate, complement and support the work of (inter)governmental bodies and policymakers.

Fig 1: the hub in relation to civil society and security policy makers



¹ This network consists of a large variety of civil society organizations and individuals, like grassroots leaders, activists, human rights defenders, peace builders, development practitioners, researchers and analysts. It emerged in the wake of the 2010 review of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, to give sharp and critical civil society input to the UN and its member states.

Core activities

Each strategy of the Human Security Collective consists of a set of activities:

1. *The Hub:*
 - a. Monitor the impact of CTMs/security measures on civil society in crucial regions/countries;
 - b. Monitor global and regional security agenda's and strategies;
 - c. Building a dynamic knowledge centre which improves human security practices on the ground.
2. *Generating and connecting knowledge, expertise and practices*
 - a. Carry out specific research on engagement strategies between CS and the security sector required for bottom up security approaches which values political space of civil society;
 - b. Develop permanent online outreach activities and member engagement through the website, social media, and private Peace Portal online community;
 - c. Strengthen the current practice of quiet diplomacy through research.
3. *Providing a platform*
 - a. Convene and facilitate encounters between stakeholders from the development, peace building, human rights and security worlds around defined themes and organize timely advocacy towards relevant policy makers;
 - b. Strengthen the participation in security agenda setting processes of young leadership in countering violent extremism in high risk areas.

Output and outcome

1a. *Monitor the impact of CTMs/security measures on civil society in crucial regions/countries*

A relevant group of policy makers (UN, FATF, Regional Organizations) acknowledge the gap between international policy and local reality on issues of counter terrorism and security. There is willingness and a crucial momentum to create the link and feed-back on the (in)effectivity of measures and propose alternative ones.

The output

- Alternative propositions to counter violent extremism and encourage human security social alternatives which are grounded in the local contexts discussed between civil society active at the grassroots and relevant policy makers;
- Discussions at the UN are conducted through a "Group of Friends" of the Foundation and the CSNHS.

The outcome Tangible changes in current and future policy and governance structures on CTM: countering violent extremism and countering terrorism financing evidenced by e.g. participation of the Foundation in the FATF consultation meetings, regular consultations of civil society with policy makers which result in effective programs and interventions in a number of communities located in fragile or repressed contexts.

Countries: Kenya, India, West Africa, Mali and Sahel, MENA, Colombia and Philippines

1b. Monitor global and regional security agenda's and strategies

The hub should have and make accesible an acurate mapping of global and regional security agenda's and strategies, in order to inform civil society/the CSNHS on particular oppourtunities for policy influencing or political advocacy and engagement.

The output Agenda's are weighted for their strategic importance in collaboration with members of the CSNHS, regularly disseminated via the Peace portal/the CSNHS website. Strategies are discussed on-line, managed by the Hub and further disseminated through the website.

The outcome Members of the CSNHS and other civil society use collectively designed strategies in relevant security meetings for their lobby and advocacy objectives.

1c. Building a dynamic knowledge centre which improves human security practices on the ground

The output A number of workshops, working conference, brown bag lunches, and strategic meetings are organized and conducted by the Foundation for/with civil society and for civil society and other relevant actors.

The outcome The Foundation is recognized by relevant civil society, policy makers and grant-makers as an effective and appropriate hub for accessing and disseminating knowledge and practices by civil society on human security alternatives to hard security measures and approaches.

2a. Carry out specific research on engagement strategies between CS and the security sector required for bottom up security approaches which values political space of civil society

Engagement between CS and the security sector is complex. In the first place mistrust between both hinders proper communication. Also misunderstanding, diversity in agenda's and differences in operatonial dynamics are obstacles for engaging. Research on engagement can help us to shape a functional interface

The output One to two studies are conducted by a collaborative of researchers and practitioners on a yearly basis that generate recommendations on appropriate engagement within a specific regional, country or local context.

Studies are conducted on exemplary civil society – government engagement on countering violent extremism. These studies give

evidence to validate the UN counter terrorism strategy and other transnational and national CTM frameworks

The outcome The research supports civil society organizations and networks in a specific geographic location to improve their engagement with the security sector and other relevant authorities leading to constructive change in security practices that improves human security in communities.

Countries to be determined by the constituent partners of the Foundation.

2b. Develop permanent online outreach activities and member engagement through the website, social media, and private Peace Portal online community.

This portal provides communities and private membership around relevant topics. It is a meaningful platform to mobilize and engage a wide variety of civil society organizations on issues of common concern and strengthen capacities to counter violent extremism at grass root level .The information is well protected. It is meant for civil society in the first place, policy makers can have access to their own layers on the portal.

Output Exchange among civil society on their security knowledge and practices which supports visibility and the collaboration and communications among network members. Outreach leads to greater knowledge about the CSNHS and the foundation and expansion of the members of the network. Successful branding of the network allows for leveraging access to Governments, the UN and other relevant international organizations. Tailor-made contributions for planned events by involved actors. Actual information on relevant studies and events. Expansion of knowledge of the foundation and the network among policy makers and other interested actors.

Outcome The online activities lead to off-line activities that significantly change security practices in a number of communities in focus countries and regions where the CSNHS and the foundation are active.

2c. Strengthen the current practice of quiet Diplomacy through research.

Peace builders that engage directly with armed groups that in the wake of 9/11 have been labelled as terrorists are hindered in their work by so-called terrorist lists and by stringent government and international organizations' oversight measures that impede financial and political support to such engagement together with members of the network it has been engaging with.

Output Research on quiet diplomacy; methodology used, successes achieved and conditions required to conduct quiet diplomacy. A number of dialogue sessions with relevant stakeholders are organized and facilitated by the Foundation to discuss impediments to this practice such as the blacklisting of proscribed (terrorist) groups with CTM entities at the UN and in Europe.

Outcome Continual support to on-going quiet diplomacy processes which encourage alternative ways of moving forward to complex on the ground dialogue facilitation.
Growing support to exempt quiet diplomacy initiatives from stifling civil society oversight mechanisms such as the Holder vs Humanitarian Law project in the US.

3a. *Convene and facilitate encounters between stakeholders from the development, peace building, human rights and security worlds around defined themes and organize timely advocacy towards relevant policy makers.*

Expansion of awareness raising on the impact of security measures on civil society's political and operational space among civil society communities: conflict prevention, peace building, peace education, women leadership on peace and security, human rights, development and humanitarian assistance.

The output A number of encounters are organized and facilitated on the requests of the CSNHS and as anticipated by the Foundation based on its relations with the wider security world. In the pipeline are meetings at the CSW/Commission on the Status of Women with Women Learning Partnership and GNWP (partners of BU WLPS), the WinG (Women in Governance networkin India) and a number of GPPAC regional organizations. Events in collaboration with E.g. Cordaid's Netherlands programme on dialogue, integration, peace education among youth.

The outcome Civil society is strengthened in their human security practices, recognized by communities, and policy makers as a key actor in shaping security policies and implementing these on the ground.

3b. *Strengthen the participation in security agenda setting processes of young leadership in countering violent extremism in high risk areas*

Output Strengthened strategic relationships with relevant youth networks in the Mena, Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa and the Netherlands

Outcome The Foundation is recognized by civil society and policy makers as the hub through which to convene and coordinate initiatives that encourage youth leadership for transformation in fragile contexts. A number of regional young leadership networks actively contribute in the two-way communicating between civil society and policy makers on countering violent extremism.

Countries Mena (Libya, Palestine, Tunisia), East Africa: Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and The Netherlands

5 Governance model

Board members

The nature of the Foundation calls for a board that has an international remit. The ambition of the Foundation to become a visible and reputable entity that connects development, human rights, conflict prevention and security calls for board members with a regional and international reputation that will guide the foundation's broader strategic-substantive direction and are willing to lend their reputation to help boost the work of the foundation. A strategically well-connected board is paramount for the foundation in its process to reach its mission.

Program advisory group

Besides the Board, the Foundation will be supported by a program advisory group. This group of 5 to 7 persons comprises civil society participants from the Civil Society Network for Human security. They will advise the coordinators in the execution of their initiatives in the different regions and in the pursuance of initiatives that are based on "human security related asks and needs" of civil society in the various countries and regions. The program advisory group will give input from their daily practice for 1) an outcome – evaluation plan of the Foundation that is related to the activities it undertakes and 2) a linking and learning model which will systematically document and analyze its effectiveness as a hub.

The Foundation will pursue a balanced gender-regional representation in the Board and the program advisory group.

Functions and division of labor

HSC's staff will divide the work according to their expertise, capabilities and future ambitions. The functions that need to be fulfilled are: institutional development and outreach manager, expert and program manager. The scale of the foundation and its working model allows for a mix of responsibilities by each of the delegated persons.

The Foundation will invest in the improvement of its staff capacities and capabilities through relevant training and expertise building according to the required responsibilities. (additional languages, conflict management, business development)

6 The funding

The funding for services of the Human Security Collective consists of three main segments:

1. Member states of the UN and RIGO's (like the EU, ECOWAS, ASEAN, OAS) that promote the role of civil society in policy, implementation and monitoring of security and stability. They are primarily interested in a sustained engagement between security units of the UN/RIGO's with civil society that has vision and leadership on these issues. (They are interested in civil society initiatives addressing the problem of radicalisation, violent extremism and the recruitment of young people into terrorist networks.)

2.
 - a. Foundations preoccupied with the eroding space for civil society and violation of human rights and civil liberties due to increased securitization of societies.
 - b. Charities, humanitarian and development organisations that experience difficulties in their funding due to restrictive measures for financial transactions.
3. Tenders of multilateral donors aiming at networking and capacity building of civil society for playing an effective role in counter terrorism, countering violent extremism, de-redicalization and security issues.

Within the following product/ market combinations we distinguish different demands and added values:

Product/market		UN/RIGO's	Foundations and Charities	Multilaterals
1. the Hub	Monitor the impact of CTMs/security measures on civil society in crucial regions/countries	Demand for input for global and regional security strategies	Demand for evidence based advocacy	
	Monitor global and regional security agenda's and strategies		Demand for input on global and regional security strategies	
	Building a dynamic knowledge center which improves human security practices on the ground	Grounded and applied knowledge together with a well-connected CS network is a niche and an added value	This is a shared objective, can lead to pooled funding strategies	Tenders on CS capacity building around counter terrorism, de-radicalization and security-development nexus
2. Channeling knowledge, expertise and practice	Carry out specific research on engagement strategies between CS and the security sector required for bottom up security approaches which values political space of civil society	Un and Member States express the need for research on how to develop and implement engagement strategies with CS, evidence based research and impact studies		Tenders for studies on the nexus between Security and Development, Human Rights and Freedom of association

	Continued development of online outreach activities and member engagement through the website, social media, and private Peace Portal online community		Provision of information services and social media, online platform and virtual communities	
	Strengthen the current practice of quiet diplomacy through research	Some specific members states promote the concept of quiet diplomacy and request study on practices and impact	A few foundations are teaming up in research on the legal conditions for quiet and 3 rd track diplomacy	
3. Providing a platform	Convene and facilitate encounters between stakeholders from the development, peace building, human rights and security worlds and organize timely advocacy towards relevant policy makers	Demand for a facilitated dialogue around specific topics (like res 1373, res 1624, FATF rec8) leading to the acknowledgement of best practices, typologies and more inclusive security thinking	Demand for a facilitated dialogue cross sectoral and cross regional leading to a more collective advocacy strategy for political space in complex security s areas	
	Strengthen the participation in security agenda setting processes of young leadership in countering violent extremism in high risk areas	Input requested by UN and EU in engaging youth networks in programs on de-radicalization and incitement	High interest in research and networking around Youth involvement in security in MENA, Sub Sahel Africa and Central America	Worldbank tenders for studies on Youth, conflict and violent extremism.

The niche

The combination of a knowledge center on human security and political space, a hub that facilitates dialogue and the development of a human security network and the promotion of an advocacy agenda for political space is a niche.

All member states that have prioritized the implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy have national think-tanks and knowledge centers for security and counter terrorism. Many universities developed counter terrorism and security departments and studies. Most of these institutes lack a connection with citizens and practice in those areas where security is strongly state driven.

Civil Society, on the other hand, is not well organized around issues of security. They are not tuned in with the reality of the security policy processes that impact their political and operational space. Seldom CS gathers across different sectors and different regions to strategize for a collective input on security agenda's. Human Security Collective brings local and global together and creates cross links within CS to focus and deal with security issues.